In this paper we estimate the rate of return to firm investments in human capital in the form of formal job training. We use a panel of large firms with detailed information on the duration of training, the direct costs of training, and several firm characteristics. Our estimates of the return to training are substantial (8.6%) for those providing training. Results suggest that formal job training is a good investment for these firms possibly yielding comparable returns to either investments in physical capital or investments in schooling.
Introduction
Individuals invest in human capital over the whole life-cycle, and more than one half of lifetime human capital is accumulated through post-school investments on the firm (Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998) . This happens either through learning by doing or through formal on-the-job training. In a modern economy, a firm cannot afford to neglect investments in the human capital of its workers. In spite of its importance, economists know surprisingly less about the incentives and returns to firms of investing in training compared with what they know about the individual's returns of investing in schooling. 1 Similarly, the study of firm investments in physical capital is much more developed than the study of firm investments in human capital, even though the latter may be at least as important as the former in modern economies. In this paper we estimate the internal rate of return of firm investments in human capital. We use a census of large manufacturing firms in Portugal, observed between 1995 and 1999, with detailed information on investments in training, its costs, and several firm characteristics. 2 Most of the empirical work to date has focused on the return to training for workers using data on wages (e.g., Bartel, 1995 , Arulampalam, Booth and Elias, 1997 , Mincer, 1989 , Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005 . Even though this exercise is very useful, it has important drawbacks (e.g., Pischke, 2005) . For example, with imperfect labor markets wages do not fully reflect the marginal product of labor, and therefore the wage return to training tells us little about the effect of training on productivity. Moreover, the effect of training on wages depends on whether training is firm specific or general (e.g., Becker, 1962 , Leuven, 2004 . 3 More importantly, the literature estimating the effects of training on productivity have little or no mention of the costs of training (e.g. Bartel, 1991 , Black and Lynch, 1998 Conti, 2005) . This happens most probably due to lack of adequate data. As a result, and as emphasized by Mincer (1989) and Machin and Vignoles (2001) , we cannot interpret the estimates in these papers as well defined rates of return.
The data we use is unusually rich for this exercise since it contains information on the duration of training, direct costs of training to the firm as well as productivity data. This allow us to estimate both a production and a cost function and to obtain estimates of the marginal benefits and costs of training to the firm. In order to estimate the total marginal costs of training, we need information on the direct cost of training and on the foregone productivity cost of training. The first is observed in our data while the second is the marginal product of worker's time while training, which can be estimated. We do not distinguish whether the costs and benefits of training accrue mainly to workers or to the firm. Instead, we quantify the internal rate of return to training jointly for firms and workers. 4 This implies that, to obtain estimates of the foregone opportunity cost of training we will not take into account whether firms or workers support the costs of training.
The major challenge in this exercise are possible omitted variables and the endogenous choice of inputs in the production and cost functions. Given the panel structure of our data, we address these issues using the estimation methods proposed in Blundell and Bond (2000) . In particular, we estimate the cost and production functions using a first difference instrumental variable approach, implemented with a system-GMM estimator. By computing first differences we control for firm unobservable and time invariant characteristics. By using lagged values of inputs to instrument current differences in inputs (together with lagged differences in inputs to instrument current levels) we account for any correlation between input choices and transitory productivity or cost shocks. Our instruments are valid as long as input decisions in period t − 1 are made without knowledge of the transitory shocks in the production and cost functions from period t + 1 onwards. 5 Several interesting facts emerge from our empirical analysis. First, in line with the previous literature (e.g., Pischke, 2005 hours per year, leads to an increase in current productivity of 0.6%. Increases in future productivity are dampened by the rate of depreciation of human capital but are still substantial. This estimate is below other estimates of the benefits of training in the literature (e.g., Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2005, Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1999) . If the marginal productivity of labor were constant (linear technology), an increase in the amount of training per employee by 10 hours would translate into foregone productivity costs of at most 0.5% of output (assuming all training occurred during working hours). 6 Given this wedge between the benefits and the foregone output costs of training, ignoring the direct costs of training is likely to yield a rate of return to training that is absurdly high (unless the marginal product of labor function is convex, so that the marginal product exceeds the average product of labor).
Second, we estimate that, on average, foregone productivity accounts for less than 25% of the total costs of training. This finding shows that the simple returns to schooling intuition is inadequate for studying the returns to training, since it assumes negligible direct costs of human capital accumulation. In particular, the coefficient on training in a production function (or in a wage equation) is unlikely to be a good estimate of the return to training.
Moreover, without information on direct costs of training, estimates of the return to training will be too high since direct costs account for the majority of training costs (see also the calculations in Frazer and Lowenstein, 2005).
Our estimates indicate that, while investments in human capital have on average zero returns for training for all the firms in the sample, the returns for firms providing training are in the data, and firms cannot forecast future shocks. Given the relatively short length of our panel our ability to test this assumption is limited. Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2005) apply an identical methodology (using industry level data for the UK) for a longer panel and cannot reject that second order serial correlation in the first differences of productivity shocks is equal to zero. In their original application, Blundell and Bond (2000) also do not find evidence of second order serial correlation using firm level data for the UK. 6 For an individual working 2,000 hours a year, 10 hours corresponds to 0.5% of annual working hours.
quite high (8.6%). Such high returns suggest that on-the-job training is a good investment for firms that choose to undergo this investment, possibly yielding comparable returns to either investments in physical capital or investments in schooling. 7 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use. In section 3, we present our basic framework for estimating the production function and the cost function. In section 4 we present our empirical estimates of the costs and benefits of training and compute the marginal internal rate of return for investments in training. Section 5 concludes.
Data
We use the census of large firms (more than 100 employees) operating in Portugal (Balanco Social year (which will be important to determine average worker turnover within the firm). We use information for manufacturing firms between 1995-1999. This gives us a panel of 1, 500 firms 7 As a consequence, it is puzzling why firms that choose to undergo this investment in training, train on average such a small proportion of the total hours of work (less than 1%). We conjecture that this could happen for different reasons but unfortunately we cannot verify empirically the importance of each of these hypotheses. First, it may be the result of a coordination problem (Pischke, 2005) . Given that the benefits of training need to be shared between firms and workers, each party individually only sees part of the total benefit of training. This may be also due to the so called "poaching externality" (Stevens, 1994) . See also Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) for an analysis of the consequences of imperfect labor markets for firm provision of general training. Unless investment decisions are coordinated and decided jointly, inefficient levels of investment may arise. Second, firms can be constrained (e.g., credit constrained) and decide a suboptimal investment. Third, uncertainty in the returns of this investment may lead firms to invest small amounts even though the ex post average return is high, although what really matters for determining the risk premium is not uncertainty per se, but its correlation with the rest of the market. However, it is unlikely that uncertainty alone can justify such high rates of return. In our model uncertainty only comes from future productivity shocks, since current costs and productivity shocks are assumed to be known at the time of the training decision. The R-Squared of our production functions (after accounting for firm fixed effects) is about 85%, suggesting that temporary productivity shocks explain 15% of the variation in output. Since productivity shocks are correlated over time this is an overestimate for the uncertainty faced by firms.
(corresponding to 5, 501 firm-year observations). On average, 53% of the firms in the sample provide some training. All the variables used in the analysis are defined in the appendix.
Relative to other datasets that are used in the literature, the one we use has several advantages for computing the internal rates of return of investments in training. First, information is reported by the employer. This may be better than having employee reported information about past training if the employee recalls less and more imprecisely the information about on-the-job training. Second, training is reported for all employees in the firm, not just new hires. Third, the survey is mandatory for firms with more than 100 employees (34% of the total workforce in 1995). This is an advantage since a lot of the empirical work in the literature uses small sample sizes and the response rates on employer surveys tend to be low. 8 Fourth, it collects longitudinal information for training hours, firm productivity and direct training costs at the firm level. Approximately 75% of the firms are observed for 3 or more years and more than 60% of the firms are observed for 4 or more years. For approximately 50% of the firms there is information for the 5 years between 1995-1999. 9 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables in the analysis. We divide the sample according to whether the firm provides any formal training and, if it does, whether the training hours per employee are above the median (6.4 hours) for the firms that provide training. We report medians rather than means to avoid extreme sensitivity to extreme values. Firms that offer training programs and are defined as high training intensity firms have a higher value added per employee and are larger than low training firms and firms that do not offer training. Total hours on the job per employee (either working or training) do not differ significantly across types of firms. High training firms also have a higher stock of physical capital. The workforce in firms that provide training is more educated and is 8 Bartel (1991) uses a survey conducted by the Columbia Business School with a 6% response rate. Black and Lynch (1997) use data on the Educational Quality of the Worforce National Employers survey, which is a telephone conducted survey with a 64% "complete" response rate. Barrett and O'Connell (2001) expand an EU survey and obtain a 33% response rate. Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2001) use information for 90 firms in France between 1981-1993 and 250 firms in Sweden between 1987-1993. One exception is Conti (2005) . She uses a large panel of Italian firms between 1996-1999 but the analysis is done at the more aggregated industry level. 9 Firms can leave the sample because they exit the market or because total employment is reduced to less than 100 employees. older than the workforce in firms that do not offer training. The proportion of workers with bachelor or college degrees is 6% and 3% in high and low training firms, versus 1.3% in nontraining firms. The workforce in firms that offer training has a higher proportion of male workers. 10 These firms also tend to have a higher proportion of more skilled occupations such as higher managers and middle managers, as well as a lower proportion of apprentices. Even though the difference between the two groups of firms is large, the number of training hours even for high training firms looks very small when compared with the 2055 average annual hours on-the-job for the (0.9% of total time on-the-job). High training firms spend 9 times more in training per employee than low training firms. These costs are 0.01% and 0.3% of value added respectively. This proportion is rather small, but is in line with the small amounts of training being provided.
In sum, firms train a rather small amount of hours. This pattern is similar to other countries in Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Spain) as well as in Eastern Europe (e.g., Bassanini, Booth, De Paola and Leuven, 2005) . We find a lot of heterogeneity between firms offering training, with low and high training firms being very different. Finally, the direct costs of formal training programs are small (as a proportion of the firm's value added) which is in line with training a small proportion of the working hours.
Basic Framework
Our parameter of interest is the internal rate of return to the firm of an additional hour of training per employee. This is the relevant parameter for evaluating the rationale for additional investments in training, since firms compare the returns to alternative investments at the margin. Let M B t+s be the marginal benefit of an additional unit of training in t and M C t be the marginal cost of the investment in training at t. Assuming that the cost is all incurred in one period and that the investment generates benefits in the subsequent N periods, the internal rate of return of the investment is given by the rate r that equalizes the present discounted value of net marginal benefits to zero:
Training involves a direct cost and a foregone productivity cost. Let the marginal training cost be given by:
where MC t is the marginal direct cost and M F P t is the marginal product of foregone worker time. In the next sections we lay out the basic framework which we use to estimate the components of M C T t and MB t+s . To obtain estimates for M F P t and M B t+s , in section 3.1 we estimate a production function and to obtain estimates for MC t in section 3.2 we will estimate a cost function.
Estimating the Production Function
We assume, as in so much of the literature, that the firm's production function is semi-log linear and that the firm's stock of human capital determines the current level of output:
where Y jt is a measure of output in firm j and period t, K jt is a measure of capital stock, L jt is the total number of employees in the firm, h jt is a measure of the stock of human capital per employee in the firm and Z jt is a vector of firm and workforce characteristics. Given that the production function is assumed to be identical for all the firms in the sample, µ j captures time-invariant firm heterogeneity and ε jt captures time-varying firm specific productivity shocks.
The estimation of production functions is a difficult exercise because inputs are chosen endogenously by the firm and because many inputs are unobserved. Even though the inclusion of firm time invariant effects may mitigate these problems (e.g., Griliches and Mairesse, 1995) , this will not suffice if, for example, transitory productivity shocks determine the de- We apply the methods for estimation of production functions proposed in Blundell and Bond (2000) , which build on Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) . In particular, we estimate the cost and production functions using (essentially) a first difference instrumental variable approach, implemented with a GMM estimator. By computing first differences we control for firm unobservable and time invariant characteristics (much of the literature generally stops here). By using lagged values of inputs to instrument current differences in inputs (together with lagged differences in inputs to instrument current levels)
we account for any correlation between input choices and transitory productivity or cost shocks. Our instruments are valid as long as the transitory shocks in the production and cost functions are unknown two or more periods in advance. Bond and Soderbom (2005) provide a rationale for this procedure, which is based on the existence of factor adjustment costs. An alternative procedure could be based differences in input prices across firms (if they existed) such as, for example, training subsidies which apply to firm A but not firm B in an exogenous way, but these are unobserved in our data.
Given the evidence in Blundell and Bond (2000) , we assume that the productivity shocks in equation (3.2) follow an AR(1) process:
where ϕ jt is for now assumed to be an i.i.d. process and 0 < ρ < 1. Taking logs from equation (3.2) and substituting yields the following common factor representation:
Grouping common terms we obtain the reduced form version of the model above.
ln Y jt = π 0 + π 1 ln K jt + π 2 ln L jt + π 3 h jt + π 4 Z jt + (3.5)
subject to the common factor restrictions (e.g., π 6 = −π 5 π 1 , π 7 = −π 5 π 2 ), where υ j =
We start by estimating the unrestricted model in equation (3.4) and then impose (and test) the common factor restrictions using a minimum distance estimator (Chamberlain, 1984) . Empirically, we measure Y jt with the firm's value added, K jt with book value of capital and L jt with the total number of employees. Z jt includes time varying firm and workforce characteristics -the proportion of males in the workforce, a cubic polynomial in the average age of the workforce, occupational distribution of the workforce and the average education of the workforce (measured by the proportion workers with high education)as well as time, region and sector effects. h jt will be computed for each firm-year using information on the training history of each firm and making assumptions on the average knowledge depreciation.
Since the model is estimated in first differences the assumption we need is E ϕ jt − ϕ jt−1 X jt−2 = 0, where X is any of the inputs we consider in our production function. Therefore, we allow the choice of inputs at t, X jt, to be correlated with current productivity shocks ε jt , and even with the future productivity shock ε jt+1 , as long it is uncorrelated with the innovation in the auto-regressive process in t + 1, i.e. ϕ jt+1 , i.e., these shocks are not anticipated. In this case, inputs dated t − 2 or earlier can be used to as instruments for the first difference equation in t (similarly, Y jt−1 can be instrumented with Y jt−3 or earlier).
Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that it is possible that these instruments are weak, and it may be useful to supplement this set of moment conditions with additional ones pro-
When can this assumption be justified? Here we reproduce the discussion in Blundell and Bond (2000) , which is as follows. Suppose we have the following model:
where y is output, x is input, η i is the firm fixed effect, and e it is the time varying productivity shock. Suppose further that x follows an AR(1) process:
The absolute values of α and γ are assumed to be below 1. After repeated substitution and first differencing of this equation, we obtain:
Therefore, one way to justify E (∆x it η i ) = 0 would be to say that E (∆x i2 η i ) = 0. This, however, may be a quite unappealing assumption, since firms with a larger fixed effect may grow faster, especially in their early years. Instead, we assume that t is large enough for the firm to be in steady state, and the role of ∆x i2 to disappear. In steady state, it is plausible to assume that the growth rate of the firm depends on the growth rate of productivity, rather than on the level of productivity. Actually, at least in the five years covered by our sample, firms do not seem to be on a path of sustained growth. Indeed, regressing current firm growth on past growth yields a negative coefficient, indicating that a year of firm growth is generally followed by a year of decline. 11 The evidence in section 4 will show that using only the first set of instruments will raise problems of weak instruments in our sample. Therefore, we will use system-GMM in our preferred specification and will report the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. 12 In general, given the instrumental variables estimates of the coefficients, it is possible to test whether the first difference of the errors are serially correlated. Unfortunately, given the short length of the panel, we can only test for first order serial correlation of the residuals, which we reject almost by construction (since a series of first differences is very likely to exhibit first order serial correlation). The hypothesis that there exists higher order serial correlation (which would probably invalidate our procedure) is untestable in our data. 13 11 Available from the authors upon request. 12 This approach as been implemented by others in the litertaure (e.g., Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2005, Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz, 2001, Zwick, 2004 , Conti, 2005 . 13 Although we have 1,500 firms in our sample, the effect of training on productivity is identified with only approximately 61% of the sample, for whom we have three or more observations. The remaining firms are used to identify other parameters in the model, for which we do not need to instrument (e.g., year effects). There are five years of data in our panel but we can use at most four years for each firm because we use lagged training as our main explanatory variable (the first year of data is used only to construct the training stock). With three years of data it is not possible to test for serial correlation in the errors (since three years is the minimum number of years needed to identify the model), while with four years of data we can only test for first order serial correlation.
Hopefully this is not a big concern. Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2005) apply an identical method to analyze the effect of training on productivity (using industry level data for the UK over a longer period) and cannot reject that second order serial correlation in the first differences of productivity shocks is equal to zero. In their original application, Blundell and Bond (2000) also do not find evidence of second order serial correlation using firm level data for the UK.
We assume that average human capital in the firm depreciates for two reasons. On the one hand, skills acquired in the past become less valuable as knowledge becomes obsolete and workers forget past learning (e.g, Lillard and Tan, 1986 ). This type of knowledge depreciation affects the human capital of all the workforce in the firm. We assume that one Using the permanent inventory formula for the accumulation of human capital yields the following law of motion for human capital (abstracting from j):
where H jt is total human capital in the firm in period t (H jt = L jt h jt ), X jt is the number of new workers in period t, E jt is the number of workers leaving the firm in period t and i t is the amount of training per employee in period t. 14 At the end of period t, the stock of human capital in the firm is given by the human capital of those L jt − E jt workers that were in the firm in the beginning of the period t (these workers have a stock of human capital and receive some training on top of that) plus the training of the X jt new workers. This specification implies that the stock of human capital per employee is given by:
Our estimation procedure is robust to endogenous turnover rates since they can be subsumed as another dimension of the endogeneity of input choice. 15 Under these assumptions, skill depreciation in the model is given by (1 − δ)φ jt . We assume that δ = 17% per period in our base specification, although we will examine the sensitivity of our findings to this assumption. Our choice of 17% is based on Lillard and Tan (1986) , who estimate an average depreciation in the firm is between 15% and 20% per
year. This number is also close to the one used by Conti (2005) in her baseline specification (15%). 16 We estimate the turnover rate from the data since we have information on the initial and end of the period workforce as well as on the number of workers who leave the firm (average turnover in the sample is 14%). The average skill depreciation in our sample is 25% per period. We measure i jt with the average hours of training per employee in the firm. 17 15 In approximately 3% of the firm-year observations we had missing information on training although we could observe it in the period before and after. To avoid losing this information, we assumed the average of the lead and lagged training values. This assumption is likely to have minor implications in the construction of the human capital variables because there were few of these cases. 16 Alternatively, we could have estimated δ from the data. Our attempts to do so yielded very imprecise estimates. 17 Since we cannot observe the initial stock of human capital in the firm (h 0 ), we face a problem of initial conditions. We can write:
where h j0 is the firm's human capital the first period the firm is observed in the sample (unobservable in our data). Plugging this expression into the production function gives:
However, µ jt becomes a firm fixed effect only if skills fully depreciate (δ = 1 or φ jt = 0 for all t) or if there is no depreciation (δ = 0) and turnover is constant (φ jt = φ j ). If 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < φ jt < 1, then µ jt depreciates every period at rate (1 − δ) φ jt . If h 0 is correlated with the future sequence of i jt+s then the production function estimates will be biased, and our instrumental variable strategy will not address this problem. Although it would be possible to estimate h 0 by including in the production function a firm specific dummy variable whose coefficient decreases over time at a fixed and known rate (1 − δ) φ t , this procedure would be quite demanding in terms of computation and data. For simplicity, we assume we can reasonably approximate the terms involving h 0 with a firm fixed effect. This difficulty comes from trying to introduce some realism in the model through the consideration of stocks rather than flows of training, and the use of positive depreciation rates, both of which are sometimes ignored in the literature.
The semi-log linear production function we assume implies that human capital is complementary with other inputs in production ( ∂ 2 ln Y ∂H∂X > 0, where X is any of the other inputs). However, we do not believe this is a restrictive assumption. In fact, it is quite intuitive that such complementarity exists since labor productivity and capital productivity are likely to be increasing functions of H (workers with higher levels of training make better use of their time, and make better use of the physical capital in the firm). The only concern would be that H and workers' schooling could be substitutes, not complements (workers' schooling is one the inputs in Z). In this regard, most of the literature shows that workers with higher levels of education are more likely to engage in training activities than workers with low levels of education, indicating that, if anything, training and schooling are complements. (2005), we estimated other specifications where we include polynomials in human capital in the production function. Since higher order terms were generally not significant we decided to focus our attention on our current specification.
The Costs of Training for the Firm
In the previous section we described how to obtain estimates of the marginal product of labor and, therefore, of the foregone productivity cost of training. Here we focus on the direct costs of training. To estimate M C t , we need data on the direct cost of training. These include labor payments to teachers or training institutions, training equipment such as books or movies, and costs related to the depreciation of training equipment (including buildings and machinery). Such information is rarely available in firm level data sets. Our data is unusually rich for this exercise since it contains information on the duration of training, direct costs of training and training subsidies.
Different firms face the same cost up to a level shift. We do not expect to see many differences in the marginal cost function across firms since training is probably acquired in the market (even if it is provided by the firm, it could be acquired in the market). 19 Therefore we model the direct cost function using levels of cost instead of log cost with a quadratic spline in the total hours of training provided by the firm to all employees, with several knots (using logs instead of levels gives us slightly lower marginal cost estimates). Initially we included a complete specification with knot points at the 1st, 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th, and 99th, percentiles of the distribution of (positive) training hours. However, in the estimation, the first six knot points systematically dropped from the specification due to strong collinearity (the distribution of training hours is fairly concentrated), and only the last three remained important. Therefore,in the final specification we include knots that correspond to the 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles of the distribution of training hours.
Our objective with this functional form is to have a more flexible form at the extreme of the function where there is less data, to avoid the whole function from being driven by extreme observations. This specification also makes it easier to capture potential fixed costs of training, that can vary across firms. In particular, we consider:
where C jt is the direct cost of training, I jt is the total hours of training, D zt is a dummy variable that assumes the value one when I jt > k z (z = 1, 2, 3 year dummies, η j is a firm fixed effect and ξ j is a time varying cost shock. 20 We estimate the model using the Bond (1998, 2000) system GMM estimator (first differencing eliminates η j and instrumenting accounts for possible further endogeneity of I jt ). We described this method in detail already, and again we believe that the identifying assumptions are likely to be satisfied by the cost function. We assume that
rather than k ≥ 2 to increase the chances that the assumptions above hold. 21 We do not reject the test of overidentifying restrictions, and therefore that is the specification we use.
Empirically, C jt is the direct cost supported by the firm (it differs from the total direct cost of training by the training subsidies), and I jt is the total hours of training provided by the firm in period t.
One last aspect with respect to the cost function concerns the choice of not modelling the temporary cost shock as an autoregressive process, as it was done for the production function. In fact, we started with such a specification. However, when we estimated the model the autoregressive coefficient was not statistically different from zero, and therefore we chose a simpler specification for the error term.
From the above estimates we obtain ∂C jt ∂I jt . To obtain the marginal direct costs of an additional hour of training for all employees in the firm we compute ∂C jt ∂I jt L jt . 20 We also estimated another specification, where we trimmed all the observations for which total hours of training were above 15,945 (90% percentile). In doing so we removed extreme observations. We then estimated a quadratic cost function as in (3.7) (but without the know points). The resulting estimates of marginal costs came out smaller, resulting in larger returns. We come back to this below. 21 In fact, if we assume the above assumptions hold for k ≥ 2 we reject the test of overidentifying restrictions. Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients on labor and on the stock of training for alternative estimates of the production function. Column (1) For the latter specification we report the coefficients after imposing the common factor restrictions. 22 We also present the p-values for two tests for the latter specification: one is a test of the validity of the common factor restrictions, the other is an overidentification (Hansen-Sargan) test. We can neither reject the overidentification restrictions nor the common factor restrictions. 23 Our preferred estimates are in column (3) because they account for firm fixed effects and endogenous input choice. Table A2 in Again, this helps explaining why the system-GMM estimator, which exploits both sets of moment conditions, works well for our final specification. Even though our initial sample has 5, 511 observations (firm-year), we can only estimate the effect of training on productivity for a smaller sample. This happens because we use lagged training to construct the stock 22 Table A1 in the appendix reports the estimated coefficients for the full set of variables included in the regression with system-GMM. Columns (1) and (2) present the unrestricted and restricted models, respectively. 23 We estimate the model using the xtabond2 command for STATA, developed by Roodman (2005) .
Empirical Results
of training (and the first observation for each firm is not used in estimation) and because our preferred specification of the production function is estimated in first differences (and we lose one further observation per firm). 24 Columns (1) and (2) . Given that the impact of training on productivity lasts for more than just one period, ignoring direct costs would lead us to implausibly large estimates of the return to training (unless the marginal product of labor function is convex, so that the marginal product exceeds the average product of labor). As explained in the previous section, we will use the coefficient on labor input in column (3) of table 2 to quantify the importance of foregone productivity costs of training for each firm. 24 However, it is reassuring that the results obtained using OLS on the sample of firms that is reported in columns (2) and (3) of table 2 would yield similar findings to the ones reported in column (1) of the same table. 25 For an individual working 2,000 hours a year, 10 hours corresponds to 0.5% of annual working hours.
The results of estimating the direct training cost function in equation (3.7) are reported in table 3 . These estimates are based on a larger set of firms than the ones reported in table 2 because we use as explanatory variable the current training, not the lagged. In other words, in our specification current training affects current costs of training and lagged training affects current productivity. Again, for comparison, we report the estimates for different methods. Column (1) estimates the equation in levels with ordinary least squares, column
(2) estimates the equation in first differences with least squares and column (3) estimates equation with system-GMM. 26 Regarding the latter, one specification that works well, both in terms of the strength of the first stage relationships, and in terms of non-rejection of overidentifying restrictions, takes variables lagged 3 periods to instrument the first differences of the endogenous variables, and first differences lagged 2 periods to instrument for the levels. Table A3 in the appendix reports the reduced form equation equivalent to the first stage when using system-GMM. The significance of the instruments for hours of training in both in Panel A and B, give us confidence on these estimates using the system-GMM methodology.
We test and reject that all coefficients on training are (jointly) equal to zero. We also test whether second order correlation in the first differenced errors is zero and do not reject the null hypothesis. Similarly, we do not reject the test of overidentifying restrictions for the cost function (P value reported in table 3 ). 27 We proceed to compute the marginal benefits and marginal costs of training for each firm.
On average, we estimate that foregone productivity accounts for less than 25% of the total costs of training. This finding is of great interest for two related reasons. First, it shows that a simple returns to schooling intuition is inadequate for studying the returns to training. In particular, it is unlikely that we can just read the return to training from the coefficient on training in a production function. 28 The reason is that, unlike the case of schooling, direct 26 It is reassuring to see that, the results obtained using OLS on the sample of firms that is reported in columns (2) and (3) of table 3 would yield similar findings to the ones reported in column (1) of the same table. 27 For ease of interpretation of the regression coefficients, Figure 1 in the appendix reports the graphical representation of the marginal cost of training with the three alternative methodologies reported in table 3. We plot the marginal cost up to the 90th percentile of the distribution of training hours (equivalent to 16,000 hours of training in the firm). 28 As emphasized in Mincer (1989) , this is likely to also be a problem in wage regressions.
costs cannot be considered to be negligible. Second, without data on direct costs estimates of the return to investments in training are of limited use given that direct costs account for the majority of training costs. Unfortunately it is impossible to assess the extent to which this result is generalizable to other datasets (in other countries) because similar data is rarely available. However, given the absurd rates of return implicit in most of the literature when one ignores direct costs (e.g., Frazer and Lowenstein, 2005), we conjecture that a similar conclusion most hold for other countries as well.
Finally, 29 In this paper heterogeneity in returns across firms does not come from a random coefficients specification, but from non-linearity in training and labor input in the production and cost functions. Of course, misspecification of the production or cost functions will affect these estimates. One important reason to report returns both for the average firm in the sample, and for the average firm providing training, is that we are more confident in our estimates of the marginal direct costs of training for the latter group of firms. The former group of firms are in a corner solution, and it is probably hard to estimate the cost function at 0 hours of training. 30 The estimate goes up to 12.8% when we consider an alternative cost function where we trim all obser-One criticism to our approach could be that depreciation rates could vary across firms, and we are only capturing this variation through heterogeneity in the turnover rate, and turnover is probably does not represent all heterogeneity in depreciation rates. For example, it would not capture the incidence of the maternity leave period on the workforce, unless the mother leaves the firm permanently. Moreover, it is possible that the rate of skill deprecia- Another criticism is related to the possible complementarity between the average ability in the workforce and training. On the one end, firms whose workers have higher levels of ability vations above the 90th percentile. We feel more confident about leaving all the data in and modelling the tails of the distribution of hours in a flexible way, but present this alternative estimate for completeness. could engage in more training activities. On the other end, even within a firm, managers could provide training to the most able workers for whom the returns are the highest, and then worry about training for everyone else in the firm. Regarding the first concern, since our estimation strategy explores the variation in levels, we would be mainly worried about changes in training stocks that are correlated with changes in the unobserved skills of the workforce (given that all permanent effects should be handled by the fixed effect). The remaining changes in unobserved skills are treated as unforecastable productivity shocks and the instrumental variable strategy that we explore in the system-GMM methodology would address them. Nevertheless, the second concern is trickier. It implies that the effect of training varies across firms, because it would depend on the type of workers that are selected to undertake training in each firm. In this case, the instrumental variable approach would not address this concern and it is unclear exactly which parameter we would be estimating in such a case.
Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the internal rate of return of firm investments in human capital. We use a census of large manufacturing firms in Portugal between 1995 and 1999 with unusually detailed information on investments in training, its costs, and several firm characteristics.
Our parameter of interest is the return to training for employers and employees as a whole, irrespective of how these returns are shared between these two parties.
We document the empirical importance of adequately accounting for the costs of training when computing the return to firm investments in human capital. In particular, unlike schooling, direct costs of training account for about 75% of the total costs of training (foregone productivity only accounts for 25%). Therefore, it is not possible to read the return to firm investments in human capital from the coefficient on training in a regression of productivity on training. Data on direct costs is essential for computing meaningful estimates of the internal rate of return to these investments.
our estimates of the internal rate of return to training vary across firms. While invest-ments in human capital have on average negative returns for those firms which do not provide training, we estimate that the returns for firms providing training are substantial, our lower bound being of 6.7% and our preferred estimate being 8.6%. Such high returns suggest that company job training is a sound investment for firms that do train, possibly yielding comparable returns to either investments in physical capital or investments in schooling.
Data Appendix
The data used is the census of large firms conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment in the period 1995-1998. We restrict the analysis to manufacturing firms. All the firms are uniquely identified with a code that allows us to trace them over time. This data collects information on balance sheet information, employment structure and training practices. All the nominal variables in the paper were converted to euros at 1995 prices using the general price index and the exchange rate published by the National Statistics Institute.
In the empirical work, we use information for each firm on total value added, book value of capital depreciation, total hours of work, total number of employees, total number of employees hired during the year, total number of employees that left the firm during the year (including quits, dismissals and deaths), average age of the workforce, total number of males in the workforce, total number of employees with bachelor or college degrees, total number of training hours, total costs of training, firm's regional location and firm 5-digit ISIC sector code.
We define value added as total value added in the firm, employees is the total number of employees at the end of the period, Hours work is the total hours of work in the firm (either working or training), Capital depreciation is the book value of capital depreciation 31 , Share of high educated workers is the share of workers with more than secondary education in the firm, Age of the workforce is the average age of all the employees in the firm, Share males in the workforce in the share of males in the total number of employees in the firm, Training hours per employee is the total number of hours of training provided by the firm (internal or external) divided by the total number of employees, Training hours per working hour is the total number of training hours provided by the firm (internal or external) divided by the total hours of work in the firm, Direct cost per employee is the total training cost supported by the firm (include, among others, the wages paid to the trainees or training institutes and the training equipment, including books and machinery) divided by the total number of employees, Average worker turnover is the total number of workers that enter and leave the firm divided by the average number of workers in the firm during the year, Average number of workers in the firm during the year is the total number of workers in the beginning of the period plus the total number of workers at the end of the period divided by two.
